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[Abstract]  The merging of some water utilities in Japan has become possible since the 
2000 Outline of Administrative Reform and the 2001 Water Act Revision.  There are two 
avenues to merge water utilities, horizontal consolidation and vertical integration.   
Horizontal consolidation enables water distributors, such as the large water supply systems, 
to merge into one.  Vertical integration enables water distributors and water wholesalers, 
such as the bulk water supply systems, to merge into one.  However, these wide area 
consolidations or integrations haven’t been promoted at local government level due to an 
absence of authority.  Further, promotion has also been hindered by the lack of previous 
studies to support the economies of wide area consolidations or integrations. 
This paper focuses specifically on vertical integration between the water 
intake-purification and water distribution stages.  To investigate economies of vertical 
integration, I estimate the translog cost function in the Japanese water supply industry and 
calculate economies of vertical integration between water intake-purification and water 
distribution stages directly following the separability assumptions.  Furthermore, we also 
take into account the purchased water ratio in calculating economies of vertical integration.   
The results show that the economies of vertical integration exist between the water 
intake-purification and water distribution stages, especially in the case of the lower 
purchased water ratio.  Therefore, water supply systems that need to purchase high 
percentages of purified water would receive benefits of cost efficiency from the improvement 
of lower capacity utilization of purification plants. 
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1. Introduction 
 
    Since the first modern water supply system was constructed in Yokohama in 1887, 
water supply systems have basically been owned by local governments such as city, town, 
and village.  This is mainly due to the opinion that local governments were considered to 
play an important role in avoiding waterborne infectious disease as well as prevent fire 
expansions. (Fire expansions resulted from the popularity of wooden houses being built in 
Japan at that time)  Therefore, a large number of small water supply systems have been 
operating in Japan.  Although the Japanese government has been aware of the possibility 
of inefficiency due to the existence of a large number of small water supply systems, the 
wide area consolidations or integrations among already operated water supply systems 
hasn’t been promoted due to an absence of authority, except for some areas where water 
intake and water purification activities have been jointly operated among some local 
governments. 
    However, recently in 2000, the Japanese water industry reached a crossroad due to 
discussions relating to administrative reforms.  Since the 2000 Outline of Administrative 
Reform supported by the Koizumi Cabinet, many local governments merged.  This became 
known as the Great Heisei Era Consolidation (3,232 in 1999 to 1,840 in 2006).   
Subsequently, many water supply systems have been inevitably consolidated or integrated.  
However, the consolidations or integrations of water supply systems have been promoted for 
political purposes rather than economic purposes.  Actually, nobody really knows whether 
or not these consolidations or integrations lead to cost efficiency. 
        Another turning point was the Water Act revision in 2001 whereby many water utilities 
acquired options that allowed them to operate by themselves, or outsource whole or some 
parts of water supply systems, to other water utilities or new entrant water companies.  
Water suppliers became aware of the importance to discuss the possibility of reducing the 
cost in order to operate jointly with other suppliers or outsource some, or whole parts of 
water supply systems. 
This paper focuses specifically on the vertical integration between the water 
intake-purification and water distribution stages.  To investigate economies of vertical 
integration, I estimate the translog cost function of the Japanese water supply industry and 
test separability hypotheses among the water intake, purification and distribution stages.  
Therefore, this article is organized in the following manner: Section 1 as outlined above.    3
Section 2 describes an overview of the Japanese water industry.  Section 3 presents the 
method of our analysis.  Section 4 presents the results of our analysis.  The concluding 
remarks are summarized in Section 5. 
     
2. An overview of the Japanese water industry 
 
  The water supply systems in Japan are categorized into four types by the Water Act.   
Table 1 shows the number and definitions of each type of water supply system.  There are 
a large amount of water supply systems in Japan, however the majority of them are very 
small, especially in the area of the small water supply and the small private water supply 
systems.  It is worth mentioning that almost all of the water supply systems are owned by 
local governments, or by water authorities that are owned by some local governments. 
Further ten are owned by privately owned companies in the large water supply category.  
In contrary to the US or Europe where many private companies have a major role in the 
water industry, the ten private companies in Japan are very small and are owned by local 
developers. In addition, all of them receive a request to supply water from their local 
government, therefore they don’t have any competitive power against the public water 
supply organizations. 
 
< Table 1 > 
 
< Figure 1 > 
 
Figure 1 shows the time trend of public and private utility rates from 1992 to 2004.   
As you can see the water utility rate has dramatically increased whereas other utilities 
have either stabilized or decreased.  The water utility rate increase is due to three factors: 
the number of water supply systems; a lack of competition due to deregulation issues; and 
ownership of water supply systems.  Table 1 shows the number of water supply systems 
with the majority being small water supply systems.  In a previous study Mizutani and 
Urakami(2001), it was concluded that the optimal size of a water supply system should be 
800,000 however these water supply systems are less than 5,000.  Therefore we consider 
that cost inefficiency is affected by the large number of small water supply systems.  In 
addition, the type of ownership contributes to the increase in price, for example, publicly   4
owned water companies over estimated future demand perhaps due to the companies focus 
on social welfare issues rather than cost efficiency.  Further, the publicly owned companies 
overspent on construction of water intake and purification plants that resulted in a cost 
burden.   In contrast, the privately owned companies are focused on minimizing costs and 
maximizing  profits.    
However, the main reason for the increase is the non-deregulation of the Japanese 
water industry resulting in a lack of competition.     
  In the case of the telecommunication industry, the competition between mobile 
phone companies has escalated due to the popularization of mobile phones, as well as the 
competition between broadband companies due to the wide use of ISDN, ADSL and optical 
networking.  Hence, the connection fees of fixed phone line networks have been 
dramatically decreasing.  In the case of the electricity industry, new entry to electric 
generation has been promoted in the area of large contracts due to the deregulation of the 
electricity industry.  Subsequently, gas and steel companies have started to generate 
electricity for self usage as well as for re-sale.  Thus, the price of electricity has been 
decreasing.  Increased competition in the market place is also affected by the privatization 
of the expressway company and the electric company’s plan to supply natural gas.  In 
contrast, deregulation of the water industry has not been promoted therefore it is 
impossible to create competition between water companies.  As already mentioned local 
government owned water companies used to seek maximization of social welfare, so they 
often provide excess investment resulting in increased water prices.   
  The Cabinet Office investigated the situation of the water industry especially in 
relation to higher prices of water rather than other public rates.  They conclude that the 
main reason for high priced water was the cost burden of purchased water and depreciation 
expense.  We can easily understand from Table 2 that the average cost of purchased water 
is higher when the purchased water ratio is higher.  Therefore, the Cabinet Office made 
suggestions that water companies should consolidate their plants or vertically integrate 
water intake-purification companies and water delivery companies in order to save costs 
and operate water supply systems more efficiently. 
 
< Table 2 > 
 
  In this analysis, I focus specifically on the economies of vertical integration between   5
water intake-purification and water delivery activity.  Therefore I will explain the method 




  As mentioned by Nemoto and Goto(2004), there are two approaches for testing 
economies of vertical integration.  One is the subadditivity test of the multi-output cost 
function in which an output is specified as one output of a vertically integrated firm.  
Following this approach, Kaserman and Mayo(1991), Gilsdorf(1994), Kwoka(2002), 
Jara-Dias et al.(2004) and Nemoto and Goto(2004) find evidence for the existence of 
economies of vertical integration.  The other approach is to test separability among the 
production stages.  Following this approach, Lee(1995) and Hayashi et al.(1997) provided 
supporting results for economies of vertical integration.  As far as I know, while all these 
previous studies were investigated in the electricity industry, there is no published paper 
which tests economies of vertical integration in the water industry. 
  I estimate cost functions for the water intake-purification stage and water delivery 
stage respectively under the separability assumption and also estimate cost function for 
whole stages of water supply systems under the integration assumption.  Then I compare 
the estimated costs and test the economies of vertical integration.  The theoretical 
framework will be explained in the following section. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
        A cost function of integrated firms is as follows: 
 
    C VI= CVI (Q, PL, PK, PC, PP, PO,   Z )        ( 1 )  
 
    Where CVI is a total cost of vertically integrated water supply systems, Q is delivered 
water, PL, PK, PC, PP and PO are input factor prices of labor, capital, chemical, purchased 
water and others. Z is a control variable. 
    If water supply systems are separable into upward stage (water intake and water 
purification stage) and downward stage (water delivery stage), the above cost function will 
be changed as follows:   6
 
    C NVI= CNVI {CU(X, PL, PK, PC, PO), CD(Q, PL, PK, PP, PO, Z)}      (2) 
 
    Where  CNVI is a total cost of vertically disintegrated water supply systems, X is purified 
water, CU is a total cost of upward stage and CD is a total cost of downward stage.  If we 
assume that the intermediate goods are to be sold at a marginal production cost, the above 
equation would be changed as follows: 
 




    P J =∂CU /∂X          ( 4 )  
 
    We  can  estimate  economies  of  vertical integration (EVI) directly as follows: 
 
    E V I = C VI/CN V I          (5) 
 
        If EVI<1 then the vertical structure is characterized by economies of vertical 
integration.  On the contrary, if EVI>1, there are diseconomies of vertical integration and 
the two separated water supply systems are more efficient.  Finally, if EVI = 1, there are 
no economies or diseconomies of vertical integration. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
 
  The functional form of the cost function is specified as the translog cost model.  
The model of integrated firms is as follows: 
 
 lnCVI   =  α0 + αQ(lnQ) + Σiβi(lnPi) +γPWRlnZPWR 
+ 1/2αQQ(lnQ)(lnQ) + ΣiαQi(lnQ)(lnPi) + αQPWR (lnQ)(lnZPWR) 
+ 1/2ΣiΣj ηij(lnPi)(lnPj) + Σi ηiPWR(lnPi)( lnZPWR)  
+ 1/2γPWRPWR(lnZPWR) (lnZPWR)      (6) 
    7
Where CVI, total costs of vertically integrated water supply systems; Q, amount of water 
delivered(thousand square meters); Pi, input factor price( i(or j) = L(labor), K(capital), 
C(chemical), P(purchased water), O(other)); ZPWR, purchased water ratio as a control 
variable.  
  In this model, we also impose restrictions on input factor prices such that Σiβi = 1, 
ΣiαQi = 0, Σiηij = 0, Σi ηiPWR = 0.  Furthermore, we apply Shepherd’s Lemma from equation 
(6) and obtain the input share equations: 
 
 Si  =βi + λQi(lnQ) +Σj ηij(lnPj)       (7) 
 
Where Si, input i’s share of the cost function.    Since the sum of all the cost share equations 
is unity, one cost share equation must be deleted for estimation. 
  In contrast, the model of disintegrated firms is as follows: 
 
 lnCNVI  =  α0 + αQ(lnQ) + Σiβi(lnPi) +γPWRlnZPWR 
+ 1/2αQQ(lnQ)(lnQ) + ΣiαQi(lnQ)(lnPi) + αQPWR (lnQ)(lnZPWR) 
+ 1/2ΣiΣj ηij(lnPi)(lnPj) + Σi ηiPWR(lnPi)( lnZPWR)  
+ 1/2γPWRPWR(lnZPWR) (lnZPWR)      (8) 
 
Where CNVI, total costs of vertically disintegrated water supply systems; Q, amount of water 
delivered(thousand square meters); Pi, input factor price( i(or j) = L(labor), K(capital), 
P(purchased water), J(purified water) O(other)); ZPWR, purchased water ratio as a control 
variable. 
  As mentioned in section 3.1, we derived marginal production costs of the upper 
stage (PJ) as follows: 
 
 P J   = ∂CU /∂X 
  = {CU /X }{∂lnCU /∂lnX } 




   8
Where 
 
 lnCU   =  α0 + αX(lnX) + Σiβi(lnPi)  
+ 1/2αXX(lnX)(lnX) + ΣiαXi(lnX)(lnPi)+ 1/2ΣiΣj ηij(lnPi)(lnPj) (10) 
  
Where CU, total costs of upward stage (water intake and purification); X, amount of 
purified water (thousand square meters); Pi, input factor price ( i(or j) = L(labor), K(capital), 
C(chemical), O(other)).  In equation (8) and (9), we can impose restrictions and define cost 
share equations in the same way as equation (6). 
 




All of the data used in this study was collected from The Yearbook of Public 
Firms,(Chihou Kouei Kigyo Nenkan, in Japanese), edited by the Research Association of 
Local Public Firm Management (Chihou kouei Kigyou Keiei Kenkyu Kai, in Japanese) and 
Data Handbook of Water Supply, (Suidou Toukei, in Japanese), edited by Japan Water 
Works  Association.  The  Yearbook  and  Handbook report quantitative and financial data for 
all water utilities in Japan.    The number of observations is 561 in FY2003. 
  The variables used for the estimation of three (whole, upward stage and downward 
stage) cost functions are shown in Table 3 and defined as follows:  Total cost of vertically 
integrated water supply systems (CVI) is the sum of labor, capital, chemical, purchased 
water and other costs, whereas total costs of vertically disintegrated water supply systems 
(CNVI) is the sum of labor, capital, chemical, purchased water, others and total cost of 
upward stages.  As for the output measure, we used the annual total amount of delivered 
water (Q) for whole and downward stages and the annual total amount of purified water (X) 
for upward stages.  Further, we defined five kinds of input factor prices.  Firstly, the labor 
price (PL) defined as the average annual salary per employee. Secondly, the capital price 
(PE) obtained by the  multiplication of the sum of depreciation expenditure divided by 
depreciation assets and interest expenditure divided by the amount of corporate loans, and 
the deflator of capital stock assets.  Thirdly, the price of chemical (PC) defined as the 
expenditure for chemical per amount of purified water.       9
In addition, the fourth type relates to the price of purchased water (PW) defined as 
the expenditure for purchased water in relation to the amount of purchased water.    Finally, 
the price of other costs (PO), such as outsourcing cost and tax payments, is 1 as a numeraire.   
The purchased water ratio (ZPWR) as a control variable is defined as the amount of 
purchased water divided by the total amount of delivered water.  We assume that these 
input factor prices are the same across all stages.  On the contrary, we should allocate 
labor, capital, and other costs to each stage because we can not obtain accurate cost data of 
each stage.  Therefore, the way we allocate three cost data is as follows: labor cost is 
allocated by a ratio of the number of employee in each stage.  Capital and other costs are 
allocated by the operating expense ratio of each stage.   
 
4.2 Estimation results 
 
The results from the estimation of the cost function are shown in Table 4.  The 
estimation method is the SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) for the cost 
model with input share equations.  The goodness-of-fit in these regressions are acceptably 
high for each model.   The estimated cost models meet almost all of the required properties.   
Firstly, symmetry and homogeneity in input factor prices are satisfied because of the 
restrictions imposed on input factor prices.    Further, monotonicity and concavity conditions 
in the cost model are satisfied at least locally.  The first-order coefficients in the cost model 




  We also checked the scale economy (SE) of water supply systems.  The results 
show slight increasing return to scale in both vertically integrated and vertically 
disintegrated model at the sample mean point. 
  Further, from the estimation results, we calculate economies of vertical integration 
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We can easily understand from Table 5 that the water supply systems with higher 
purchased water ratio show higher economies of vertical integration.  This means that the 
water supply systems that have to purchase purified water less than 100% of their total 
delivered water should own and operate a purification plant.  This should result in low 
level capacity utilization due to the restriction of the contract of purchase responsibility of 
purified water with wholesaler of purified water even in the case where demand is 
decreasing.  Therefore, the water supply systems with higher purchased water ratio 
receive the benefit of vertically integrated operation between the water-intake and 




  This paper focused on the economies of vertical integration between upward stages 
(water intake and purification activity) and the downward stages (water delivery activity).  
We analyzed whether or not vertically integrated water supply systems receive any benefit 
from joint operation between upward and downward stages.  To analyze this, we assumed 
the separability condition and estimated the translog cost function for vertically integrated 
and disintegrated model and directly induced economies of vertical integration.    Further, in 
calculating the economies of vertical integration (EVI), we took into account the differences 
of the purchased water ratio because we considered these factors affected the EVI measure. 
The final results obtained from this analysis are as follows: (1) there are economies 
of vertical integration in the Japanese water supply industry; (2) the water supply systems 
that have a lower purchased water ratio can receive higher economies of vertical 
integration.  
These results show that the water supply systems can receive cost efficiency from 
vertically integrated systems, especially in the case of the lower purchased water ratio.  
Therefore, we think water supply systems that have to purchase high percentages of 
purified water would receive the benefit of cost efficiency from improvement of lower 
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Table 1 Number of water supply systems (FY2003) 
 
Bulk water supply  109 
Publicly owned  1,926  Large water supply 
Privately owned  10 
Small water supply  8,360 
Small private water supply  7,314 
Total  17,719 
(Source): Management indices of water utilities, FY2003. 
(Note): Bulk water supply is the water supply system which supplies portable water to 
large/small water supply systems not to the end user.  Large water supply is the system 
where the planned population to be supplied is more than 5,001.    Small water supply is the 
system where the planned population supplied is between 101 and 5,000.  Small private 
water supply is the water supply system in buildings equipped with receiving water tanks 
having the capacity of more than 10m3 and receives portable water from large/small water 
supply systems.   













































Figure 1 Price indices of public utility rates (1992=100) 
(Source): Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
 
 








bulk water supply  0%  85  90.9 
0% 981  179.8 
< 20%  133  189.0 
< 40%  173  206.6 
< 60%  171  223.3 
< 80%  162  207.7 
< 100%  87  238.3 
large water supply 
100% 161 294.6 
(Source): Management indices of water utilities, FY2003. 
(Note): One observation in bulk water supply and two observations in large water supply 
are excluded from the calculation of average cost due to data limitation.  Average cost is 
total cost per delivered water. 
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Table 3 Definition and sample mean of variables used for the estimation of cost function 
Variables Definition  Unit  Average 
TCU  Sum of labor, capital, chemical and 
other costs of upward stage 
thousand yen  1,338,964 
TCD  Sum of labor, capital, purchased 




Q  Annual delivered water  thousand squared 
meter 
22,058 
X  Annual purified water  thousand squared 
meter 
16,890 
CLU  Average annual salary of upward 
stage 
thousand yen  324,356 
CLD  Average annual salary of downward 
stage 
thousand yen  342,386 
CKU  Sum of depreciation costs and 
interest cost of upward stage 
thousand yen  570,437 
CKD  Sum of depreciation costs and 
interest cost of downward stage 
thousand yen  784,706 
CC  The expenditure for chemical  thousand yen  16,688 
CP  The expenditures for purchased 
water 
thousand yen  507,525 
COU  Other costs of upward stage  thousand yen  427,483 
COD  Other costs of downward stage  thousand yen  555,479 
PL  Average annual salary per employee thousand 
yen/employee 
8,415 
PK  Sum of depreciation costs per assets 
and interest cost per corporate loans
-  6.536 
PC  The expenditure for chemical per 
amount of purified water 
yen / m3  1.160 
PP  The expenditures for purchased 
water per the amount of purchased 
water 
yen / m3 
13.823 
PJ  Estimated in the cost model  yen / m3  1,279 
PWR  Amount of purchased water per 
delivered water 
-  0.248 
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Table 4 Estimation Results 
Vertically disintegrated   Vertically  integrated 










α0 14.931  0.019  13.857  0.020  15.506  0.027 
αQ 0.957  0.015  0.941  0.015  0.966  0.015 
βL 0.152  0.004  0.204  0.009  0.121  0.012 
βK 0.372  0.006  0.502  0.007  0.362  0.017 
βC 0.080  0.010  0.049  0.005  -  - 
βP 0.200  0.008  -  -  0.197  0.008 
βJ -  -  -  -  0.108  0.014 
βO 0.196  0.013  0.246  0.008  0.212  0.023 
γPWR 0.000  0.016  -  -  -0.052  0.013 
αQQ 0.090  0.010  0.106  0.007  0.057  0.008 
αQL 0.000  0.003  -0.029  0.005  0.001  0.003 
αQK -0.007  0.004  0.016  0.004  -0.008  0.004 
αQC -0.031  0.006  0.013  0.002  -  - 
αQP 0.003  0.004  -  -  0.004  0.003 
αQJ -  -  -  -  0.008  0.004 
αQO 0.035  0.008  0.001  0.004  -0.005  0.006
αQPWR -0.006  0.005  -  -  -0.007  0.004 
ηLL 0.149  0.017  0.194  0.032  0.140  0.016 
ηLK -0.056  0.012  -0.117  0.023  -0.059  0.012 
ηLC 0.002  0.001  0.000  0.003  -  - 
ηLP -0.001  0.001  -  -  0.000  0.001 
ηLJ -  -  -  -  -0.012  0.004 
ηLO -0.095  0.019  -0.078  0.025  -0.068  0.018 
ηLPWR -0.004  0.001  -  -  -0.004  0.001 
ηKK 0.092  0.020  0.097  0.024  0.081  0.020 
ηKC -0.001  0.002  -0.004  0.003  -  - 
ηKP -0.001  0.001  -  -  -0.003  0.001 
ηKJ -  -  -  -  -0.003  0.006 
ηKO -0.035  0.020  0.024 0.021  -0.016  0.020 
ηKPWR -0.009  0.001  -  -  -0.006  0.001 
ηCC 0.013  0.001  0.007  0.001  -  - 
ηCP -0.001  0.001  -  -  -  - 
ηCO -0.012  0.003  -0.004  0.002  -  - 
ηCPWR -0.001  0.001  -  -  -  - 
ηPP 0.013  0.001  -  -  0.017  0.001 
ηPJ -  -  -  -  -0.004  0.001 
ηPO -0.010  0.002  -  -  -0.010  0.002 
ηPPWR 0.004  0.001  -  -  0.003  0.000 
ηJJ -  -  -  -  -0.074  0.005 
ηJO -  -  -  -  0.093  0.008 
ηJPWR -  -  -  -  -0.008  0.001   16
ηOO 0.152  0.030  0.058  0.033  0.001  0.030 
ηOPWR 0.009  0.002  -  -  0.016  0.002 
γPWRPWR 0.002  0.002  -  -  -0.002 0.002 
R2  0.946   0.875   0.972  
SE 1.045  0.016  1.062  0.016  1.035  0.016 
 
 
Table 5 Economies of vertical integration with respect to purchased water ratio 
Purchased water ratio  Average EVI  Number of observations 
0% 0.238 279 
0~20% 0.484  46 
20~40% 0.524  70 
40~60% 0.545  54 
60~80% 0.543  64 
80~99% 0.589  48 
Total 0.338  561 
 
 